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This article aims at deriving lessons from the Russian financial crisis 
through examining the root causes of the crisis based on a probit 
model incorporating 20 monthly macroeconomic and financial sector 
indicators spanning the period 1988:1  – 1998:8. The results turned 
out to be as expected. Strong evidence emerged suggesting that the 
significant variables are foreign direct investment/GDP, inflation, 
world oil prices, real interest rates, current account/GDP, GDP per 
capita, foreign exchange reserves, stock prices, real exchange rate, 
and export growth. Signs of the variables were mostly in line with 
what one would have expected, except public debt, bank reserves / 
bank assets, real interest rates, and lending and deposit rate spread. 
 
JEL Classification: C10,  





   After the demise of the USSR in the latter part of the 20th century, 
Russia pegged the ruble to the US dollars to cope with high levels of 
inflation. Up to late 1997, the sales of ruble denominated discount 
instruments and coupon bonds, known as GKOs and OFZs, by the 
government were successful. In 1998, however, the government 
began facing difficulties selling ruble denominated debt due to 
adverse domestic political developments, weak commodity prices, 
and global economic events. Hence, the government decided to 
replace the ruble denominated debt into US dollar denominated 
Eurobonds. The growing burden of borrowing had raised concerns 
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about Russia's default on its treasury bills as pressures on debt, 
equity, and exchange markets decreased the investors’ confidence. 
During this time, Russia had made herself extremely vulnerable to 
adverse external developments. It became highly dependent on a 
healthy global economy, as its capital flow model was based 
excessively on the existence of a demand for exports. When the East 
Asian financial crisis break out in 1997, prices for Russia's two most 
valuable sources of capital flows, energy and metals, plummeted. 
Given Russia’s fragile economy, the rapid decline in the value of 
those two capital sources resulted in an economic chaos in the 
country where GDP per capita fell, unemployment soared, and global 
investors liquidated their Russian assets. By July 1998, Russian 
government was unable to rollover treasury bills maturing before the 
end of 1999. On August 17, 1998, Russian government abandoned to 
defend the exchange rate peg, declared unilateral default on $40 
billion in short-term domestic treasury debt, of which about one third 
was held by foreign investors, and placed a 90-day moratorium on 
commercial external debt payments. 
  
   This article aims at deriving lessons from the Russian f inancial 
crisis through examining the root causes of the crisis based on a 
probit model incorporating 20 monthly macroeconomic and financial 
sector variables. This article is structured as follows. Section 2 
reviews the literature on financial crises. Section 3 presents the data 
and introduces the methodology followed. Section 4 presents the 
results and the last section points out the conclusions that emerge 
from the study.  
 
2. Literature Review 
 
   As seen in Feridun (2004), literature on financial crises is 
categorized into three mainstream models, namely first-generation 
models, second-generation models, and third-generation models. In 
the "first-generation" models (Krugman 1979; Flood and Garber 
1984), a government with persistent money-financed budget deficits 
is assumed to use a limited stock of reserves to peg its exchange rate 
and the attempts of investors to anticipate the inevitable collapse 
generates a speculative attack on the currency when reserves fall to Feridun, M.             Russian Financial Crisis Of 1998: An Econometric Investigation 
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some critical level.  In "second-generation" models (Obstfeld 1994, 
1996, Ozkan and Sutherland 1995, Radelet and Sachs 1998) policy is 
less mechanical: a government chooses whether or not to defend a 
pegged exchange rate by making a tradeoff between short-run 
macroeconomic flexibility and longer-term credibility. The crisis 
then arises from the fact that defending parity is more expensive as it 
requires higher interest rates. Should the market believe that defense 
will ultimately fail, a speculative attack on a currency develops either 
as a result of a predicted future deterioration in macro fundamentals, 
or purely through self-fulfilling prediction. The need for third 
generation models became apparent in 1990s with Mexican Tequila 
crisis of 1994 and the East Asian crisis of 1997. A number of new 
approaches have emerged to explain how these crises evolved and 
how they spread from country to country. Third-generation models 
(Dooley 1997, Krugman 1998, Radelet and Sachs 1998) are 
categorized into three different groups such as herd-behavior, 
contagion, and moral hazard.   
   
   Probit and logit models, pioneered by Frankel and Rose (1996), use 
limited dependent variable models known as probit or logit 
regressions to identify the causes of crises and to predict future 
crises. This approach defines a crisis indicator equal to one or zero 
depending on whether a currency crisis does or does not occur within 
the specified time period. Frankel and Rose (1996) attempted to find 
out how international debt structure and external factors affected the 
probability of currency crises.  They used a number of external, 
internal and foreign macroeconomic variables in a multivariate probit 
model specified for  105 developing countries, covering annual data 
from 1971 to 1992. They defined a crisis as at least 25% depreciation 
of the nominal exchange rate that also exceeds the previous year's 
depreciation level by at least 10% and constructed a dummy crisis 
variable according to that rule.  Results of their model indicate that 
the  significant variables are output growth, foreign direct 
investment/total debt, reserves, domestic credit growth, external debt 
and foreign interest rates. Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996) also 
used a probit model to analyze currency crises, particularly the 
Mexican Tequila Crisis of 1995, using a sample of 20 emerging 
countries that were vulnerable to contagion effect. They used the International Journal of Applied Econometrics and Quantitative Studies  Vol.1-4(2004) 
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weighted sum of the percent decrease in reserves and the percent 
depreciation of the exchange rate as their crisis index. They found 
that  crises happened only in the countries with weak fundamentals 
such as low reserves,  fragile banking systems and overvalued 
exchange rate. They also found evidence showing that short-term 
capital inflows do not matter when reserves and fundamentals are 
strong  whilst government consumption  and current account deficits 
matter only in the countries with weak fundamentals and weak 
reserves.  Berg and Pattillo (1999) tested models offered by 
Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1998), Frankel and Rose (1996) 
and Sachs, Tornell, Velasco (1996) to see i f these models could 
predict the Asian Crisis using information available at the end of 
1996. They found out that the models offered by Sachs, Tornell, 
Velasco (1996) and Frankel and Rose (1996) were ineffective in 
forecasting the Asian Crisis. The Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart 
(1998) model, on the other hand, proved to be successful. Crisis 
probabilities generated by this model for the period between May 
1995 and December 1996 were statistically significant predictors of 
actual crisis occurrence over the  following 24 months.  Berg and 
Pattillo (1999) also found out that in  all three approaches, the 
probability of a currency crisis increases when domestic credit 
growth is high, the real exchange rate is overvalued relative to trend, 
and the ratio of M2 to reserves is high. In a recent study, Komulainen 
and Lukkarila (2003) examined the causes of financial crises in 31 
emerging market countries during 1980-2001 using a probit model 
based on 23 variables. Their findings show that financial crises occur 
together with banking crises and an increase in private sector 
liabilities, public debt, foreign liabilities of banks, unemployment, 
inflation, and US interest rates raises the probability of a crisis.  
Feridun (2004) summarizes the empirical literature on financial 
crises. 
 
3. Data and Methodology  
 
   The probit model is estimated for a set of 20 monthly observations 
spanning the period 1988:1  – 1998:8. Most data are gathered from 
DataStream. The data for government debt figures come from several 
sources, including International Financial Statistics, the World Feridun, M.             Russian Financial Crisis Of 1998: An Econometric Investigation 
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Bank’s WDI and IMF country reports. The tested 20 indicators are 
selected on the basis of currency crisis theories and previous 
empirical literature. In addition to the traditional macroeconomic 
variables, w e include several indicators describing the vulnerability 
of domestic banks. These indicators include the growth of bank 
deposits, the ratio of the lending rate to the deposit rate, and the ratio 
of bank reserves to assets. We also employ variables that indicate 
vulnerability to a sudden stop of capital inflows. These variables are 
public debt, broad money to reserves, and private sector liabilities. 
To study foreign influences on crises, we include the US interest rate 
and the world oil prices. In 1998, fuel,  that is, crude oil and 
petroleum products plus natural  gas, accounted for 43% of Russian 
exports (Economist Intelligence Unit, 1998). Since we study all these 
variables simultaneously, we hope to distinguish those indicators that 
reflect actual causes of the recent crises in emerging markets. The 
probit model is set up as follows:   
 
        y t* = X t-i b + et                       e t ~ N(0,s
2)               (1)         
       CRISIS t  = X t-i b + et               e t ~ N(0,s
2)               (2)  
 
where CRISIS t is assumed to be an observable process for each 
country and its position in time t depends on information available at 
time t-1 and the random error term e. We observe y in such a way 
that: 
     y = 1 if CRISIS t > 0                                                     (3) 
     y = 0 if CRISIS t < 0                                                     (4) 
 
Therefore, the probability that y = 1 is the probability that: 
 
  CRISIS t  > 0, or,                                                              (5) 
 P(CRISIS t  >0) = P(Xb+e>0) = P(e > -Xb)                     (6)  
 
where X is the vector or explanatory variables. As shown in 
equations (3) and (4), a binary dummy crisis variable is constructed 
for the financial crises. This dummy variable takes the value of one 
or zero depending on whether a currency crisis does or does not 
occur. If the crisis takes place, the dependent variable takes the value International Journal of Applied Econometrics and Quantitative Studies  Vol.1-4(2004) 
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of 1. Otherwise it remains 0. The dependent variable is then 
regressed on the explanatory variables.  
      
   The probit model assumes that the probability distribution function 
corresponds to normal distribution. Since in currency crisis situation 
a successful attack leads to sharp currency depreciation and 
substantial reserve losses, both the signal approach and limited 
dependent models traditionally define a currency crisis as a discrete 
event. One common technique is to construct an index of exchange 
market pressure as a weighted average of exchange rate changes and 
reserves changes (as well as interest rates in some cases). The crisis 
is said to occur when the index exceeds a certain threshold level. At 
this point, we calculate an exchange market pressure index (EMP) for 
Russia. The index includes exchange rate depreciation and loss of 
reserves, which are weighted to influence equally. The exchange 
market pressure index takes the form: 
EMP = ?e – (s e/s r)*?r   (2) 
where  ?e denotes the change  in exchange rate and ?r in 
international reserves,  se and sr denote the standard deviation of 
exchange rate alteration and reserves, respectively. We determine the 
values of the EMP index more than two standard deviations above 
the mean as a crisis. Since macroeconomic variables often worsen 
prior to the actual crisis, we define as a crisis not only the crisis 
month but also the eleven months before. In other words, we use a 
one-year window for our variables.  
 
4. Empirical Results 
 
   As Table 1 indicates, the signs of the variables are mostly in line 
with our expectations, with the exception of public debt, bank 
reserves / bank assets, real interest rates, and lending and deposit rate 
spread. The significant variables are foreign direct investment/GDP, 
inflation, world oil prices, real interest rates, current account/GDP, 
GDP per capita, foreign exchange reserves, stock prices, real 
exchange rate, and export growth. Table 2 summarizes the results of 
the study. These results come with no surprise. The Russian GDP, for 
instance, contracted 4.6% in 1998 and a contracting economy is more 
vulnerable to financial crises. It is noticeable that the year 1998 was a Feridun, M.             Russian Financial Crisis Of 1998: An Econometric Investigation 
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particular year for Russia as real GDP reached the minimum value of 
the period 1990-2003, starting to increase afterwards. The Russian 
inflation rate, on the other hand, was 84.4% in 1998, almost 73% 
higher than that of the previous year. During the same period, 
Russian interest rates increased sharply as a sign of loss of investor 
confidence, and the value of the ruble plummeted. 
 
Table 1 Probit Model Results 
Variable  Coefficient 
Z-
statistic  Variable  Coefficient 
Z-
statistic 
Inflation  42.14  1.74* 
US interest 
rates 




-29.12  1.68*  FDI / GDP  -9.12  1.873* 
Export 
growth  -1.34  -1.69* 
World Oil 
Prices  -13.21  1.678* 
Import 
growth  0.23  -0.22 
Real interest 
rate  -11.14  1.681* 
M1  0.34  9.83 
Public debt / 
GDP 




11.35  0.71 
Current 
account/GDP  -6.51  1.67* 
Stock 
prices  -24.83  -1.67* 
GDP per 
capita  -21.12  1.66* 
Terms of 
trade 
-11.83  -0.11 
Fiscal balance 
/ GDP 






-0.14  0.09 
M2 / foreign 
exchange 
reserves 









-22.95  2.86*** 
* Significant at the 10% level.** Significant at the 5% level, *** Significant 
at the 1% level. International Journal of Applied Econometrics and Quantitative Studies  Vol.1-4(2004) 
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Table 2. Regression Summary 









Inflation  +  +  * 
US interest 




-  -  *  FDI / GDP  -  -  * 
Export 
Growth 
-  -  * 
World Oil 
Prices 
-  -  * 
Import 
Growth  +  +   
Real interest 
rate  +  -  * 
M1  +  +   
Public debt / 
GDP  +  -   
Domestic 
Credit/GDP 
+  +   
Current 
account/GDP 
-  -  * 
Stock 
Prices  -  -  * 
GDP per 
capita  -  -  * 
Terms of 








+  -   
M2 / foreign 
exchange 
reserves 








-  -  *** 
Columns (3) and (6): * Significant at the 10% level.** Significant at the 5% 
level.*** Significant at the 1% level. 
 
     At the end of July 1998, the US dollar – ruble exchange rate stood 
at $1=R6.235. By the end of August 1998 it declined to $1=R7.905, 
and by the end of September it had declined to $1= R16.064. Due to 
the sharp depreciation of the ruble, Russian foreign exchange 
reserves declined. Besides, the Russian Central Bank sold foreign 
exchange in order to maintain a stable exchange rate for the ruble 
when the ruble was facing downward pressure until August 1998. 
Regarding external factors, world prices for oil, along with other raw Feridun, M.             Russian Financial Crisis Of 1998: An Econometric Investigation 
  121 
materials had been declining owing to the East Asian financial crisis 
of 1997. Russia was heavily dependent on exports of these products 
for its foreign reserves. At the end of January 1999, the price of 
Russian crude oil was roughly $11/barrel, down from $16/barrel at 
the beginning of the same month. Again, owing to the East Asian 
crisis of 1997 investors were highly risk averse and international 




   This study analyzed the causes of the Russian Financial Crisis of 
1998. It estimated a probit model spanning the period 1988:1  – 
1998:8. The results turned out to be as expected. Strong evidence 
emerged suggesting that the significant variables are foreign direct 
investment/GDP, inflation, world oil prices, real interest rates, 
current account/GDP, GDP per capita, foreign exchange reserves, 
stock prices, real exchange rate, and export growth. Signs of the 
variables were mostly in line with what one would have expected, 
except public debt, bank reserves/bank assets, real interest rates, and 
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